Topic: Can Adjusted Reputation Score Improve Market Efficiency? -Theory and Experiment

Speaker: Binglin Gong

Time: October 10, 2022   14:30

Location: Tencent meeting, ID: 581-153-219

Abstract: Reputation system is an important mechanism to solve adverse selection and moral hazard problems. However, in reality reviewers are heterogeneous and the scores they give might be misleading for people with different standards, especially when sample sizes are small or when reviewers are self-selected. In this study we first design two adjusted average reputation scores based on first-order information and second-order information and build economic models to show their effects on market efficiency. Then we test their effects over simple average reputation scores and a baseline treatment without reputation system in a lemon market experiment.

Introduction of the speaker: Binglin Gong is a researcher of the Faculty of Economics and Management, East China Normal University, Zijiang Young scholar and doctoral supervisor. She did her PhD in Economics, University of Maryland, USA. Her research fields include experimental economics, behavioral economics, applied microeconomics, etc. Her papers have been published in Management Science, Games and Economic Behavior, Experimental Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Economic Psychology, etc.